Prime Minister Starmer launched his government’s strategic plan for change on Thursday 5th December - fleshing out his five missions with milestones, measures and in some cases targets. In a prelude to that main meal a surprisingly packed room at the Institute for Government enjoyed some amuse bouche on the emergent approach at the centre of government. Cat Little, the Civil Service’s Chief Operating Officer and Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary spent an hour taking questions, outlining some of her big priorities and sharing her thoughts about civil service reform.
The excitement was increased by the announcement a few hours earlier that the new Cabinet Secretary would be Chris Wormald.
System Leadership, the role of government and it’s operating model
Cat Little mentioned system leadership at least 7 times according to my notes. This is a significant signal of the seriousness of the government’s intent on civil service and public service reform.
If the new leadership of government and the civil service really takes on the implications of government acting as a system leader (or steward) they will unavoidably be setting course for bold (and contested) reforms. To succeed they must address upfront the barriers that have hampered all previous efforts to this end: the accountability, identity, mindset and capability of ministers and in particular senior officials.
By 2010 the culmination of the two decades of experimentation in how government steers, shapes and holds public services to account was the realisation in both the treasury and the cabinet office that a different approach was needed. Work driven by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit on what strategic government looked like, and how it best played its system stewardship role gathered pace in the later Blair and then Brown years.
The academic description of what system leadership means is best articulated in the twin paradigms of networked governance (Osborne, 2006) and public value management (PVM) (Stoker, 2006). By drawing on industrial sociology and network theory PVM represented a substantial change in beliefs and assumptions about the role of civil service management and the job of its managers. In the PVM framework the role of the state is to ‘steer society’ through dialogue and exchange with a wider range of participants in a complex and uncertain world. Rules and incentives are insufficient - new ways to collaborate and legitimise decision making are needed.
The implications for political and managerial leaders are profound: success depends on the building of successful relationships through networks and partnerships… ‘efficiency is not achieved by handing over the job to bureaucrats or managers… the key is learning exchange and mutual search for solutions.’… ‘no one is in charge but leaders at various levels play a role. It is not a linear relationship between a principal and agent.’ (Stoker, 2006).
The implications for government are clearly set out in the Cabinet Office’s pamphlet on public service reform (Kelly, Gavin et al., 2002) ‘Excellence and fairness’ ( (Cabinet Office, 2008) and Prime Minister Brown’s Smarter Government (CM 7753, 2009).
The implications add up to a major challenge to the heritage, identity and wiring of the civil service. Little is right to emphasise the importance of developing a collective view on the role of government as a system leader, but each time there have been Cabinet Office sponsored efforts to push thinking on a future vision of the role of government and follow through the implications they have foundered on disinterest, scepticism and cynicism from even the most senior officials. There will need to be careful thought about how to succeed when most previous efforts have failed.
For example Gus O’Donnell’s least successful foray in an otherwise brilliant term as head of the civil service, was work he commissioned to try to engage perm secs in creating a vision for the civil service. It culminated in a rather ugly crash and burn workshop at ‘cardiffdale’ in 2008 (the regular Autumn Sunningdale gathering of perm secs had taken their buckets and spades to Cardiff). There was a strong sense that despite the leadership of Gus, this was not a problem and therefore didn’t need fixing. In a preceding sequence of fascinating workshop sessions of smaller groups of perm secs and DG’s discussions tended to become bit of a ‘drafting debate’ about a outline description of the future civil service. I thought senior leaders would be really provoked and engaged by the draft work from the strategy unit on system stewardship which we fed into those workshop – but there was no interest or reaction at all, even though the thinking within it ultimately formed the heart of Smarter Government (CM 7753, 2009) in Brown’s Government.
Another nugatory effort fell within the Transforming the Civil Service project co-lead by Ian Watmore, then newly returned Chief Operating Officer of the Efficiency and Reform group in the Cabinet Office and the new Director of the Institute for Government, Andrew Adonis. I supported that project from the Institute for Government. Whilst the bulk of that 12 month programme of work was engaging and productive, leading to the core of the 2012 Civil Service Reform Plan – an exception was our collective efforts to answer the question: What could/should/would a Transformed Civil Service looks like? – even though that had been an issue prioritised by the work group of 20 largely reform minded Perm Secs and DG’s (which included Bob Kerslake and Chris Wormald).
A third effort came in 2018 driven by the then Cabinet Secretary Mark Sedwill. This was an ambitious effort to establish a whole of government strategic framework in 2018. This intervention was sound in principle, doomed in set-up and practice, and lacked almost all of the factors needed for reform success. The Fusion Doctrine (cynically dubbed ‘con-fusion’ by one of the less corporate perm secs and subsequently rebranded the National Strategic Framework) initially set out to create a more accountable system to support collective decision-making, with the introduction of senior officials as senior responsible owners to deliver each of the framework’s pillars. The doctrine argued that building a culture of common purpose across departments requires improved accountability to shift incentives and behaviours towards a more genuinely whole-of-government approach.
It was conceptually plausible if generic. It drew on the strategy unit’s work in the noughties and embraced the notion of government as a system steward. But it lacked energy, political engagement, clarity and commitment from senior officials. The six strategic pillars (inclusive, prosperous, secure, wellbeing, influential, sustainable) covered everything yet meant little in practice to the priorities of ministers and their departments. The overseeing committee (which met around twice a month) was supported by an underpowered and inexperienced core team that was unable to substitute for the lack of perm sec leadership or a viable operating model. The intervention dwindled to a episodic sequence of unfocused workshops meandering around unmanageably large topics, and rapidly defaulted to a round of bidding for small, time limited packets of money from the HMT for ‘demonstrator projects’ to create a sense of action.
These three damp squibs around strategic government are in sharp contrast to the brilliant ‘future civil service visioning’ work led by David Omand, then perm sec of the Home Office, as part of the ‘Bringing in and Bringing on Talent’ reform in the late 90’s. He and a small group of perm secs started by creating compelling positive and negative visions of the future senior leadership of the civil service – and generated serious energy amongst senior colleagues for their vision of a diverse senior civil service leadership cadre that looked like the nation it served. They led very successfully towards that with unsually full engagement from Autumn Sunningdale session with all perm secs. They deployed an enlightened business model that treated departments like grown ups, allowing them to adapt and choose the interventions that made most sense in their particular workforce contexts – within some overall guiding measures that described progress towards the vision of success. It remains an almost unique model of collective perm sec leadership in the last 30 years – supported by the trusting and enabling approach of the then Cabinet Secretary Richard Wilson, and the collaborative leadership of David Omand. The IfG produced a case study of the reform.
Perhaps the most important lesson to take is that each of the three unsuccessful pushes was too abstract and wide ranging to feel relevant to the pressing day top day challenges facing senior officials. None had serious political interest so in a world where officials are hard wired to respond to ministerial priorities the bar to progress is raised very high.
Little’s implied approach of connecting work on civil service role and operating model to the challenges of shaping and delivering on the governments missions is the right way to root a discussion of the future civil service role in something tangible that has clear political priority. But how they work on it and keep it connected to politics - and how they engage across the civil service and wider systems will be crucial. It needs to be framed in a way that makes it obvious to reform minded and even maverick civil servants (of which there are plenty) that this time it is worth risking their personal and social capital by getting really engaged. Future cabinet secretaries should always be expected to have a track record of active and constructive engagement in, and leadership of cross civil service challenges throughout their SCS career – rather than waiting till they get the top job.
For those officials who have made their career by succeeding in the old world it is a big ask for them to see the value and importance of selectively breaking it - as is required by a system leadership view of government and the civil service. There are of course senior officials who were energised and active in earlier efforts – but many have left the civil service over the last 5 years. The new Cabinet Secretary was at the sceptical and even cynical end of the perm sec spectrum during the 2012 and 2016 efforts to create a space to think about a new model. That position would doubtless change if there is strong political appetite for such changes – but there is a track record question mark that he would have to overcome to be a credible leader of the Civil Service’s renewed efforts.
To address the implications of being a strategic government that acts as system leader will require strong political conviction and tenacity. Those bringing the political drive need to ensure they have sufficient strategic thinking capability to challenge the sceptical wing of officials and rebuff the default arguments which will inevitably emerge around resources and priorities for missions in the forthcoming outcome focused spending review: for example why more resources cannot be devolved, or ring fences removed or main programme funding repurposed and re-prioritised.
Some teasers on missions – and the strategy shaped hole in the centre of government
Ahead of Starmer’s big reveal, Little was circumspect on the topic of the Government’s missions, but her answer to the audience question: ‘what is the different between a cabinet committee and a mission board’ was very interesting:
For mission boards they have a clear set of practical goals – it is about long term ambition rather than the short term decisions that occupy cabinet committees… we are early on in the process… we have started regular stock-takes with the Prime Minister… [boards] will be strategic, focused, long term, with the tenacity to drive through change.
This answer reveals the reality of a long term strategic void at the centre of government, in part reflecting the lack of demand for such input and analysis from the governments of the last 14 years, and the careless abolition of the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in 2010 by the coalition government. The importance of the strategy void was emphasised by how she talked about the core purpose of the Cabinet Office (alongside the Treasury) as the centre of government and the challenges for how the Cabinet Office works:
The Cabinet Office and HMT are the centre of government, the state strategic head, with no10 at the heart of it’.
How does the cabinet office become more strategic?
What are the things that only the Cabinet Office and HMT can do as system leaders.
We need to get the right balance between control, and when we enable and facilitate.
Presumably we will see the development of some strategic capacity (with external perspectives and a preparedness to challenge the default Whitehall view and departmental advice) within the mission control teams, alongside similar capacity in the public service and civil service reform teams. This could be done through a single unit which lends staff across these functions, whilst retaining a coherent overview. But the location and nature of strategic capacity is unclear at the moment.
When I blogged about the reset of no10 recently I reflected that the missions were lightly drawn. The manifesto sketched out a few first steps and actions that signal intent without being close to a strategic, comprehensive or sufficiently bold plan that will transform outcomes. Few of them provide a tangible description of the outcomes sought. But I argued that this vagueness can be a virtue if it allows space and time for a rapid and engaging process of strategy and policy development.
I offered 7 critical questions to address if the approach to missions is to succeed. Little’s remarks ahead of Starmer’s launch give a strong indication that they are already beginning addressing 4 of those questions:
What does success look like (in terms of measurable outcomes as well as a narrative) for each mission?
How will they scope and reprioritise the potential portfolio of policies and projects for each mission?
How will they create the strategic space to identify and commission innovative approaches where needed?
How will the spending review shift main programme resources to support the missions?
Others remain to be addressed:
What leverage and decision-making power will mission boards and controllers have?
How will accountability (including parliamentary accountability) be reset to support and recognise cross departmental leadership by ministers and officials that some of the missions demand?
What support will the most senior leaders of the civil service (especially the civil service board) provide to ensure the delivery of the missions?
In my geeky civil service reform enclave I am very excited to see what Thursday’s speech brings. How far is the government’s approach addressing the lessons from past reform efforts? And are they shaping up to take the strong measures required to overcome the substantial barriers to progress on cross cutting missions?
Peter Thomas 3-12-2024
References
Cabinet Office. (2008). excellence and fairness: Achieving world class public services.
CM 7753. (2009, December). Putting the frontline first: Smarter government. HM Government.
Kelly, Gavin, Mulgan, Geoff, & Muers, Stephen. (2002). Creating public value: An analytical framework for public service reform. Cabinet Office Strategy Unit.
Osborne, S. P. (2006). The New Public Governance? 1. Public Management Review, 8(3), 377–387. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030600853022
Stoker, G. (2006). Public Value Management: A New Narrative for Networked Governance? The American Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 41–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074005282583
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